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Private Desires, Public
Pleasures: Community and
Identity in a Postmodern
World
Anthony Ashbolt

As George Orwell. Herbert Marcuse and. more recently. John Ralston
Saul have argued. language can be a key mechanism whereby social
reality is blurred. camouflaged or distorted (Orwell 1957: 143-57;
MarcuseI972: 78-103; Saul 1997: 41-75). Slogans. buzzwords and
words blatantly misused permeate contemporary discourse. Just as
the advertising industry can take a word like 'freedom' and render it a
commodity. so too politicians and journalists can take a word like
'reform; and strip it of meaning. We are told. for example, of the reforms
of the Kennett government in Victoria. Closing hospitals and schools
and wrecking the industrial relations system somehow count as
:reforms'. If something is about to undergo a reform process, as likely
as not this means it will be gutted financially. And it is always the
institutions of our public sphere being 'reformed', because the public
sphere is painted as full of waste and sloth, draining the taxpayers'
money. The private-whether private industry or private schools-are
by contrast efficient operating machines always giving value. This is
the language of the New Right but it has become commonsense discourse
today trotted out by journalists. politicians and denizens of pubs alike.
The problem some revitalized radical movement in Australia faces is in
part a problem of finding a language which gives recognition to the
strengths of the public sphere and, indeed, positively elevates the public
over the private. Here a paradox emerges-large sections of the Left.
particularly those bound up with identity politics, have focused on the
virtues of the private sphere. Now while the meaning they attach to
this is, of course, different from the New Right. it does reinforce aspects
of New-Right ideology. What Christopher Lasch called 'the culture of
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narcissism' has a strange way of drawing the Right and Left together to
celebrate a world devoid of public responsibilities, a world in which the
private and privacy are virtuous and liberating (Lasch 1978; Saul 1977:
162-3). The campaign againstthe Australia Card on the grounds of the
protection of privacy is but one example of this. So, too, is the campaign
against Tasmania's former draconian sexual laws (no more draconian
than many American states but you would have thought otherwise
given the tenor of the protests). it was left up to a few moral conservatives
to point out that the push for absolute privacy rights in this instance
could lead to the denial of the rights of women and children.
Swimming against the tide, Stanley Fish has proclaimed that 'there
is no such thing as free speech' (Fish 1994). Speech always takes place
under specific social conditions and circumstances which limit it
intrinsically to some degree. In the same way, there is no such thing as
an absolute right to privacy. Instead, rights are circumscribed by other
rights, by social conventions, by public morality. The idea of public
morality seems almost censorious and is surely guaranteed to take the
life out of every jolly (if not gay) event. What is it and how can one
determine its boundaries, and, perhaps more importantly, who defines
its nature? These are important questions but too often the ground is
taken away from so-called Left and progressive forces because the New
Right and moral fundamentalists address the issue clearly. For them
the answer is simple, indeed total. The Left, meanwhile and perhaps
understandably, goes off in all directions, defending free expression
one moment and seeking to protect children the neJ..'t, proclaiming
absolute freedom while circumscribing certain behaviour; upholding
free speech at the same time as defending racial vilification laws. This
is not necessarily contradictory but nor is it worked out carefully. Rights
invariably come into conflict and a delicate balancing act is required if
we are to simultaneously avoid the private absolutism ofAmerican first
amendment protections and the public absolUtism of moral funda
mentalists. Public morality is not synonymous with public absolutism.
Rather, it refers to that complex web of values. ethics, behaViour and
sentiment which gives strength to a public realm, and which bolsters it
against the onslaught of private profit and individual greed. it signals
collective beliefs which transcend but do not necessarily destroy private
desires. And the world of the public is not simply one of austere
adherence to a rigid set of doctrines, of behavioural codes which strait
jacket individual expression. Instead, it can and should be seen as a
potential site of resistance to authoritarianism, the foundation of social
good, the wellspring of human contentment (Habermas 1974: 49-56).
This is a very different view of 'public' from that being propagated today.
There is such a thing as society and there are such things as public

pleasures. The task is to fight against an increaSingly privatized world
in which all sense of collective endeavour, social cohesion and public
satisfaction is increasingly dissipated.
All this is not to suggest that the public sphere invariably succeeds
at its tasks, nor is it to imply that there is nothing of worth in the
private sphere (whether we take that to mean our individual worlds or
the realm of private corporations). Rather, it is to acknowledge the
necessity of the public sphere as a buffer against the worst excesses of
the private, as an arena to some degree protected from deregulated
private behaviour whether it be that in the marketplace or in the home.
The paradox of market deregulation is that far from leading to a break
out of private competition, it invariably strengthens oligopoly.
Deregulating behaviour in the bedroom is by no means a bad thing
(between consenting adults). but let us not see it as deregulation nor
as private rights but rather as public rights to be pursued in a private
domain. The central question today, however, does not concern rights
.in the bedroom (which might not. in particular places and at particular
times, be peripheral). The crux of the matter concerns people's rights
to public institutions like schools and universities, and broadcasting
media which are not subject to the dictates of some imaginary market
manipulated by moguls millions of miles away.
We do live in confusing times and that confusion is highlighted in
sometimes mysterious ways. Film reviewer Margaret Pomerantz recently
had this to say: 'I'm thinking of moving to New Zealand. I don't like the
way this country is gOing. Everything is regulated. I hate rules. Where
are the rebels? What are the university students doing about it? They're
protesting about higher fees for godsakes' (Pomerantz 1996). Well, no
.,. they're also protesting about the privatization and deregulation of
our universities. And they know that deregulation and authoritarian
(as well as banal) managerial administrative practice go hand in hand.
So there is a paradox and perhaps it's this which so befuddles
Pomerantz-deregulation only removes certain rules; other rules, even
more rigid and inflexible, take their place. But, of course, Pomerantz
can hardly be accused of knowing anything about politics. British
socialist feminist Beatrix Campbell, reflecting the despairing tone of
the British Left, reveals a different kind of confusion. Railing against
pro-family and pro-community rhetoric, she appears to seek final solace
in Princess OJ's 'struggle' against Charles: .... the daughters of the royal
family are now calling its men to account and expOSing the patriarchal
behaviOur of princes' (Campbell 1996: 26). So, fooled by the patriarchal
logic of appeals to family, neighbourhood and community, perhaps the
Left lost sight of the fact that the class struggle has shifted ground so
dramatically it is now an aristocratic parlour game. But possibly that's
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not what Campbell means-possibly, quite possibly, It Is all utterly
meaningless. And that again is the problem with language and with
words today. Signifier and signified have parted ways: but I would argue
that this reflects the success of capital which always. as Marx so
brilliantly explained, functions almost magically, abstractly, until we
finally realize that '[ulnder the ideal measure of values there lurks the
hard cash' (Marx 1906: 116).
Words come easily to Eric Hobsbawm and he ushers back 'the nation'
in his call for a change in Left direction (Hobsbawm 1996: 45). And
why not? Nothing else seems to be working, so what harm could a good
old dose of patriotism do? And In a truly obseqUious piece about the
Australian Prime Minister, Michelle Grattan reveals that John Howard
has just started Christopher Lasch's last book The Revolt oj the Elites
and the Betrayal qfDemocracy (Grattan 1996: 66-73: Lasch 1995). No
doubt he will find in that book an endorsement of his policies, a critique
of government and social-welfare liberalism, a defence of family and
community, a dismissal of the new social movements as produCts of
the professional-managerial class. The Left has rarely understood Lasch,
so why would we expect the Right to? There is much conservatism in
Lasch's analysis, much populism which runs the risk of being seen as
patriarchal and authoritarian. But there is also much good sense, Take
the following passage:

and even Todd Gitlin tend to exaggerate the once common thread
underpinning American life so, too, Lasch's ordinary person and
common folk are idealized mythologies (Hughes 1993: Schlesinger Jnr;
1992: Gitlin 1995; Ashbolt 1994). Yet. to some degree, they are
indispensable mythologies precisely because we must identify the ties
that bind. The public sphere cannot be reduced to a factional
battleground (Lasch 1995: 49). Yet neither can difference be obliterated.
The point is to create a public sphere in which both difference and
commonality can flourish.
Mckenzie Wark, like so many erstwhile Leftist inverse snobs, Invokes
ordinary people to attack the pretensions of the intellectual elite. He
waxes lyrical about the talk-show genre (Donahue, Winfrey et al.)
because they 'do deal with serious social and political issues, but they
do so in ways that most ordinary people can understand' (Wark 1996:
43). There Is something very ordinary about this sort of argument. This,
after all, Is the genre which Watergate reporter Carl Bernstein called
'the Idiot culture': Today ordinary people are being stuffed with garbage:
by freak shows, by Hard Copy, by newscasts that do special segments
devoted to hyping hype' (Bernstein 1992). What contemptfor ordinary
people Bernstein possesses. Perhaps, instead. we should listen to Wark's
words of wisdom: .... regular 1V watchers are often smarter 1V viewers
than arrogant Intellectuals' (Wark 1996: 44). This proposition reeks of
arrogance itself. Many intellectuals, so the story goes, simply have not
adjusted to the post-literate age. Wark himself has adjusted quite well
and may, Indeed, be a virtual television set. He believes in public
broadcasting but also has faith in what ordinary people want and that.
of course, is the schlock of commercial television. The problem he is
trying to identify is how to build a culture of resistance to cuts in arts
and public broadcasting. His answer is to inhabit the world of mass
culture, to absorb its signs and messages, to comprehend 'the
contemporary matrix of media vectors and the kinds of publics that
can form there and form their views there' (Wark 1996: 45). This is not
simply confusion but utter nonsense. It is a defence of the private sphere
disgUised, almost cleverly, as a defence of the public sphere. Similarly,
the championing of the ordinary person ends up in barracklng for
advertisers.
In its search for a new language, new modes of communication, the
Left cannot simply adopt the framework of the New Right as that
framework itself has been erect.ed to serve the interests of capital. Even
the term 'social capital', used continually by Eva Cox in her passionate
defence of the public sphere, is too bound up with market logic. too
much within the frames of bourgeois discourse, too easily be
appropriated by private-sphere apologists (Cox 1995). That. of course,
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To an alarming extent the privileged classes-by an expansive
definition, the top 20 percent-have made themselves Independent
not only of crumbling Industrial cities but of public services In
general. They send their children to private schools, insure
themselves against medical emergencies by enrolling In company
supported plans. and hire private security guards to protect
themselves against the mounting violence against them. In effect.
they have removed themselves from the common life (Lasch 1995:
45).
But then he beats a retreat into middle-class nationalism because'
It supposedly provided 'a common ground, a common frame of reference'
(Lasch 1995: 48-9). And one can see Howard's head nodding vigorously.
Our Prime Minister will, no doubt. ignore the fact that much of the
book is a passionate defence of the public sphere over the private sphere,
of democracy over finance capital, of community and neighbourhood
over increasingly privatized liVing. Howard will get from It what he wants
to get from it-a defence of ordinary people and their values (ordinary
people defined by their non-membership of the policy elite!. a defence
of the common folk and their way of life moulded by family, church and
safe neighbourhoods. Just as Robert Hughes, Arthur Schlesinger Jnr
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can be a problem for any term used by the Left. So much of what the
New Right has done and is doing is dressed up in the language of
community or local power. Just as Reagan stole the 'No more Vietnam'
slogan from the peace movement and New-Right ideologues stole the
once ironic term 'political correctness' from the Left, they have managed
to appropriate the language of community power for the purposes of
dismantling the public sphere. Concepts of choice and parental control
are at the centre of New-Right attempts to further privatize the school
system; giving back to people a power which the evil state bureaucracy
and teachers' unions had taken away. It all sounds like benign populism
and pluralism but It is designed to reinforce market dictates and private
desires. Once again, language has intervened to disguise what
constitutes a savage attack on the public sphere. This is truly a
postmodern politics where the signifier and signified bear absolutely
no relation to one another. Democratic choice, so it seems, has preVailed.
Yet, in reality, the rapid erosion of both meaning and substantive
democracy proceeds apace.
When the New Right has appropriated terms which might once have
had Left-liberal connotations, how then can we revive a spirited public
sphere without obliterating notions of choice, difference, identity, and
flexibility? The twilight of common dreams', to use Todd Gitlin's phrase,
is a matter of great concern (Gitlin 1995). Nonetheless, the point is not
to bury or obliterate difference but to accommodate it within an overall
framework of solidarity, collective thought and action, over-arching goals
rather than particular concessions (even though these can be important).
As Gitlin argues, 'the cultivation of separate identities is myopic for the
Left above all' (Gitlin 1995: 231). But he fails to locate the origins of
this cultivation within the dynamic of contemporary capitalism and its
Simultaneous dependence upon conformity and difference. This, after
all, is what identity politics is all about-difference within conformity.
Admittedly, the prospects of a collective consciousness which
embraces disparate groupings and sensibilities are remote. As
postmodernity propels the fragmentation of life, so, too, it assists the
fragmentation of social protest. Rights collide with each other, fractUring
whatever unity might have been possible. Fixation upon identity breeds
a self-conscious solipsism. Issues multiply and a clear focus gets lost.
The battle is over fragments, never the whole. Such is the dynamic of
postmodernist thought which perceives totalitarianism lurking behind
any concept of 'the whole'. Postmodernism is, after all, just another
variety of pluralism dressed up in identity-kit garments. Paradoxically,
this has not meant the transcendence of correct-lineism. On the
contrary, correct lines multiply along with issues and it becomes difficult
to keep up with the latest ideological fashions. Identity brand names

claim doting allegiance-one moment gay, the next queer, the next post
feminist and so on, until the labels themselves, stripped of authenticity,
are attached to simulated lifestyles. And it might well be argued that a
Simulated lifestyle is better than none at all in a postmodern world,
and who is Left (as it were) who could disagree with that?
Despite the weaknesses which flow from identity politics, it can
also be a source of great strength, a moment of resistance to a culture
of conformity which still claims much allegiance. While the market
place of contemporary capitalism reverberates with postmodern choices,
there is still a residual bland authoritarian cultural predisposition which
reasserts itself from time to time. It is not, after all, as if the Left
(multicultural or otherwise) has won any but the most marginal of
battles, and even where it has emerged victorious over affirmative action
or quotas or speech codes on campus, the significance of the victories
is exaggerated. Moreover, such 'gains' tend to serve the interests of
bureaucratic elites more than those of the downtrodden and excluded.
There is a tension within identity politics-a pull between the desire for
a certain type of community and a retreat into self. Jenny Bourne has
referred to 'the homelands of the mind' characterizing Zionist feminism
and this phrase seems appropriate for identity politics in general.
wherein community takes on an increasingly imaginary role displaced
from concrete social conditions (Bourne 1987). For instance, the gay
community refers only sometimes to place and when it refers to
something other than place it loses its resonance. One of the problems
is that 'identity' is not the preserve of supposedly Leftist or progressive
forces. Rather, contemporary capitalism has produced a crisis (for want
of a better term) in subjectivity, and identity politics is a response to
this crisis, or perhaps a retreat from this crisis into 'homelands of the
mind'. One homeland increasingly apparent in America is 'whiteness'
and so, too, within America and Australia the middle-class middle
aged male is emerging as a beleaguered, marginalized, downtrodden
species in need of an identity by-pass (Bendersk 1995: 135-57). ThiS
would be funny if it was not so dangerous and it does tend to support
Michael Lind's contention that the multicultural Left and sections of
the Right could find common ground in the sphere of identity politics
(Lind 1995: 254).
Identity is not unimportant. Personal life should be a concern of
the Left. But when a politics of subjectivity (to use Russel Jacoby's
phrase) fuels the project of social transformation, this necessarily
truncates the vision of the Left (Jacoby 1975: 101-18). Indeed, as L.A.
Kaufman has suggested, that vision (and the struggle towards it itself)
becomes bound up with a list (Kauffman 1995: 159): a list of the
disaffected and marginalized (a sometimes spectacularly colourful
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rainbow coalition) or a list of grievances which do not cohere in any
fundamental sense (unless racist sexist ageist homophobes-the list
could and does go on-form a united bloc). Yet this list does speak to
our times. Perhaps there is no real sense in getting all teary-eyed and
nostalgic. as Eric Hobsbawm has done recently. about the demise of a
universalist Left for which there is, arguably, no real structural
foundation (Hobsbawm 1996: 38-47). This is not to say that
universalism or the possibility of universalism has disappeared but
rather that fractured identity politics reflects a fractured social life.
Unless something dramatic happens to heal the fractures in social life,
then a Leftist universalism becomes increasingly difficult to achieve.
When real community, community founded upon a vibrant sense of
place, is effectively shattered by suburbanization. superhighways and
capital flight, when work and reSidence are not only separate but
increasingly out of the reach of many people. when the fast pace of
social change generates racist phobias more than worker resistance,
particular issues and identities come to the fore politically and
universalist visions and solutions recede. No amount of appealing to
people's solidarity or good sense can overcome this dynamic, And the
real problem is that, despite various attempts to establish rainbow
coalitions, there is no automatic unity between the range (or list) of
marginalized, disaffected and oppressed groups. Their agendas,
necessarily, differ but their visions of a good society (if they have one)
might be somewhat similar. And this is where universal visions and
particular identities could coalesce-around a utopian vision. But so
much of the project of the Left or progreSSive forces has dissipated into
specific demands achievable under equal opportunity capitalism that
a broader Vision becomes difficult to imagine.
i
So the particular and the universal remain divided-perhaps not
permanently but until such times as the disparate threads of
postmodern politics go beyond immediate demands and point towards
the good society. Or, as Ernesto Laclau has put It: 'The assertion of
one's own particularity requires the appeal of something transcending
it' (Laclau 1995: 147). That is, for self-determination to be realized
fully, it can only take place In a context which recognizes and gives
legitimacy to others-this necessarily places some limits on the content
of self-determination. While Hobsbawm has a point in asserting that
'the nationalist claim that they are for everyone's right to self
determination is bogus'. it Is nonetheless possible for different and.
indeed, competing Identities to Inhabit the same terrain and extend
tolerance (Hobsbawm 1996: 43). And this Is precisely where some
general concept of community (something at least which transcends
specific identity-based communities) needs to become central to Left

discourse. Just because the term has been appropriated by the Right
and stripped of meaning, this does not automatically imply that it should
be jettisoned. On the contrary, it must be rescued and Injected with
new meaning.
Community these days seems conceptually quaint. Many years have
gone by since sociologists and historians battled about its precise
definition. its location (as postmodernlsts might have it) in various
theoretical schemata. Some abandoned the concept entirely, seeing it
as fundamentally useless because of its lack of precision. Others, led
by Craig Calhoun, defended its status. argUing that mUltiple definitions
did not strip the term of legitimacy (Macfarlane 1977: 633; Calhoun
1980: 105-29). If such debates seem arcane today it is because
community is viewed either as a relic of New-Left struggles or a piece of
populist nostalgia. The early New-Left focus on community over class
has become hopelessly dated in a world of apparently free-floating
identities. And populism also missed the boat, being overloaded with
an 'unproblematized' notion of the people. Yet, arguably, the New Left
still has something to offer and it is a peculiar form of amnesia which
suggests otherwise. Moreover. some form of contemporary populism
might provide the way to bring together particular and universal claims.
The real danger with a Left populism is that it can end up repeating the
New Right's allegations about big government. To that extent, it becomes
but another episode In The X-Files (a SUitably postmodern politics, after
all). Or populist rhetoriC can seek to overwhelm any claims to
particularity, thus eliding race, gender and sexuality as speCific
concerns. According to Hobsbawm, of course. this would be all to the
good and, as already mentioned, his version of universality ends up
with an appeal to the nation or what he calls 'citizen nationalism'
(Hobsbawm 1996: 45). Clearly distraught as a consequence of recent
woeful performances by England's cricket team, he retreats into the
world ofthe nation. celebrating the 'common identity· to be found there.
But a nation is not a community and jingOism, it seems to me, is the
very worst sort of identity politics. Hobsbawm's Marxism has come
adrift on the shoals of nationalism like so much Marxism beforehand.
The universality of class no longer has resonance, so why not seek
commonality elsewhere, in that which really transcends the individual,
the group and the neighbourhood? But it must be stressed again that
community is something more than commonality. It at least hints at
(something which the nation does not do) the good society. And it can,
as Laclau has suggested. uphold a universality which embraces
particularities. Distinguishing between politics today and the politics
of modernity with Its commitment to universality, Laclau notes:
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[t]he starting point of contemporary social and political struggles
is, on the contrary, the strong assertion of their particularity, the
conviction that none of them Is capable, on its own, of bringing
about the fullness of community. But precisely because of that. as
we have seen, this particularity cannot be constructed through a
pure 'politics of difference' but has to appeal, as the very condition
of Its own assertion, to universal principles (Laclau 1995: 150).
In other words, identity politics can either wallow in the limited
certainties of Its internal politics (specifically gay, feminist or black
demands, for instance) or can embrace some notion of the common
good. To the extent that the common good is pursued, identity becomes
less central but not necessarily marginal. The good society, after all,
does not reqUire the obliteration of particular subcultures but. on the
contrary, may thrive because of them.
The common good can be perceived in a number of ways. It can
refer to the accumulation of private interests and thus be a philosophical
support for bourgeois society. Yet. as Marcus Raskin has pointed out,
this is a severely truncated concept of common good (Raskin 1986: 23
56). Only a concept which transcends class or group or regional
allegiances can point towards democratic social change-because
democracy, as Rousseau understood, was not the sum total of individual
desires or wills but rather was propelled by a general desire or will. To
some, this resonates with the ideology of fascism or totalitarianism.
Yet it need not, if it is accepted that the general will is not predicated
upon the destruction of individual desires or wills, that the public sphere
is not reliant upon the destruction ofthe private sphere. On the contrary,
a vibrant public sphere will Interact dialectically with a dynamic private
sphere. Perhaps, to borrow an idea from Raskin, the whole delineation
of public and private In capitalist society needs to be rethought. Feminist
theory, in particular, has made at least some of the divisions between
public and private appear increasingly artificial. At the moment,
however, it Is vital for radicals to resist the valorization of the private
(which is both the current dominant ideology and is also reflected by
sections of the Left) and to defend the public sphere and public
institutions from attack. In the long run, of course, we may want to
reconstitute these public Institutions. ensuring their responsiveness
to democratic desires. But in the long run we may also be left without
any effective public institutions to defend. As the public sphere comes
increasingly under pressure and attack, the whole question of ethics
and social justice, public responsibility and the common good becomes
ever more urgent.
Within America, the identity of homelessness has failed to generate
massive social resistance or even minimal civil disobedience. In the
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array of postmodern capitalist choices, life without a home has little
cultural capital. Yet David Harvey has suggested that
{t]he identity of a homeless person is vital to their sense of selfhood
... A political programme that successfully combats homelessness
(or racism) has to face up to the real difficulty of a loss of identity
on the part of those who have become victims of such forms of
oppression (Harvey 1993: 64).
He has a point. but so does Clinton in taking a leaf out of Charles
Murray's work and moving to abolish welfare. Oppression and
discrimination do facilitate the development of particular sorts of
identities. Specific forms of oppression, however, are more likely to
strip people of identity, personality, self-respect, clothes and shelter.
Under certain conditions, we can confidently ignore the therapeutic
babble which urges us tel respect each and every identity and celebrate
all difference. Harvey is on surer ground when he suggests not all 'others'
are equal-'some are more other than others'-and this requires critical
assessment. some acceptance that one group's otherness may be a
marginal concern in the overall political and economic context (Harvey
1993: 63-4). Harvey, like Laclau, sees the need for universality and
particularity to be in dynamic association. And this requires a fluid
rather than static concept of community, one open to the pressures of
a pluralist politics but not beholden to the machinations of interest
groups. To the extent that identity politics conflicts with political
citizenship, as Todd Gitlin argues, it will have to be transcended (Gitlin
1995: 237). To the extent that community and social justice need to be
pursued in creative and participatory ways, identities must be willing
to be refashioned. The end of identity politics may mark the beginning
of a politics of identity and community.
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